Exploring Ukraine's latest offensive in Kursk Oblast, its impact on the war with Russia, and the broader political goals driving the conflict.
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Ukraine's Strategic Gains in Kursk: Military Success and Political Implications |
Since last August, the Kursk Oblast of Russia has been a focal point of high interest in the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, given the beginning of the advance of Ukrainian forces and their further control over hundreds of square kilometers. It was a dramatic change in the balance of war events that for the first time forced Russia to resort to a large-scale counter-operation. Of course, it's notable that this counter-operation has involved thousands of North Korean soldiers, something Ukrainian officials have repeatedly said, though Moscow has kept notably silent on the matter. In a surprise turn of events, Ukraine launched a new offensive on three axes deep within the Kursk region on a Sunday morning recently, deploying approximately 2,000 soldiers. That operation added another 157 square kilometers in the control of Ukrainian forces, according to Deep State war mapping site, thus adding up to over 600 square kilometers the territory gained under Ukrainian control in this region. This success is being received with satisfaction on the part of Ukrainian officials and understanding in Washington. Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, hailed the result as "good news," while US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during a visit to South Korea that Ukraine's position in Kursk would be of strategic importance and a critical factor in any future negotiations that may take place.
With the element of surprise and territorial gains pulled off in this latest offensive, Ukrainian forces have nonetheless faced severe setbacks in Kursk over the past several months. Since their incursion into the region first began last August, Ukrainian troops have been forced to beat a retreat in the face of relentless Russian counter-operations. Five months ago, Ukraine had control over an area of approximately 1,300 square kilometers of Kursk's territory, along with around 100 population centers, including cities, towns, and villages. The figure today shrinks to about 600 square kilometers, reflective of the hurdles Ukraine has gone through in holding ground in the region. Today, Kursk is considered one of the five priority fronts where there is a constant advance of Russian forces, along with the fronts east and northeast of Kharkiv and the Pokrovsk and Kurakhov fronts in Donetsk. So, this struggle represents a host of questions concerning the broader goals and effective performance of the operation conducted by Ukraine in Kursk, taking into account the difference between the officially stated reactions by Ukrainian leaders and those described independently by military experts and observers.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has presented a number of strategic objectives for the Kursk operations. He claims the moves are essential to block the Russian plans of re-invasion of the Chernihiv and Sumy regions, located in the north and northeast parts of Ukraine, and which served as the launching pads for Ukrainian troops into Kursk. In the early war that started in February 2022, Russia occupied the two regions before pulling out a month later. Zelensky also emphasized that the Kursk operations would loosen the Russian pressure on the heavily contested fronts in the Donetsk region by diverting Russian forces toward Kursk. As big as these military objectives may be, observers suggest there could be other, politically driven motives behind Ukraine's persistence in trying to hold and expand its presence in Kursk. Ivan Stupak, military expert from the Ukrainian Institute for the Future and formerly an adviser with the Ukrainian parliament on military security issues estimated that no more than 30 percent of the goals set within the frames of the ongoing operation were absolutely military in nature. Those will include, he said, the goals put forward by Mr. Zelensky but also, on the strategic side, the benefit from having Kursk and Pokrovsk fronts which drain Russian manpower and North Korea's units supporting the latter. Stupak points out that Ukrainian estimates for Russian casualties in Kursk since August stand at around 40,000 killed and wounded and believes this explains Russia's request for 11,000 North Korean soldiers to send to the region.
Yet another 70%, according to Stupak, were dictated by urgent political considerations. As the Trump presidency in the US is about to expire, and following the increasing speculation about possible talks, Ukraine seeks to grasp as many cards of pressure as possible. According to Stupak, Kursk is one such card-a rare opportunity for Ukraine to create internally displaced persons inside Russia and thus engage Russian public opinion against the Putin regime. He draws this conclusion based on his belief that ongoing fighting in Kursk emphasizes the impossibility of Russia's protection of its own territory and simultaneous occupation of Ukrainian land. According to Stupak, this position of the Zelensky administration will use Kursk as some sort of a bargaining chip for a potential future swap of territories under the Russian Federation control for those presently occupied. Nevertheless, Stupak remains unconvinced that Ukraine will be able to gain significant results, either in the course of combat or negotiating efforts. He said the best-equipped and most experienced military units were involved in Kursk, while the soldiers in the Donetsk fronts were still under extreme pressure. He argued that despite the Kursk operations, this did not really ease the burden faced by Ukrainian forces elsewhere. He also says that Kursk is unlikely to be a priority for Russian President Vladimir Putin in any negotiations, considering his larger ambitions in Ukraine and the losses he has shown he is willing to suffer in pursuit of his aims.
From a military perspective, Oleg Zhdanov, a military expert and former reserve officer, presents a somewhat more optimistic outlook. He believes that the Kursk region has managed to confuse and disperse the Russian forces, even though Russia still has a numerical advantage. Zhdanov indicates that most of the Russian troops that reach the front line lack experience and efficiency, which has led to their high casualties and slow progress. He describes the conflict as a war of attrition, where Russia is set on territory at any price, while Ukraine tries to save its losses as much as possible. Zhdanov believes such a strategy eventually plays into the hands of Ukraine: "The longer this war is, the more the initiative will be gradually returned to the Ukrainian army, as it was during the battles for the liberation of Kiev, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson.". Moreover, Zhdanov pointed out that control over Kursk has a number of strategic advantages in store: it means the ability to reach sensitive Russian sites such as airports and command centers-targets hardly reachable before-and to alleviate pressure on faraway Ukrainian fronts and cities.
The fight for Kursk is complex, hence multifaceted, military, and political. While Ukraine has achieved some tactical successes and gained strategic advantages, the broader picture remains challenging. The region has become a critical battleground where Ukraine seeks to weaken Russian forces, create internal disruptions within Russia, and secure leverage for future negotiations. But at what human cost, and with so much material cost, besides-the unpredictability both of the war itself and of the wider geopolitical situation makes that a truly imposing task that is faced by Ukraine. As the war grinds on, the situation in Kursk is likely to continue to be one of the important indicators of change in the dynamic between Russia and Ukraine, with great implications for the future of the conflict and the possibility of peace.